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The legal framework for access to data from a data protection
viewpoint – especially under the GDPR
Indra Spiecker genannt Döhmann*
Introduction to data protection’s regulatory impulse
Free data for all?
Access to data and information1 can be paraphrased with a common say-
ing: ‘My data is freely available for anyone to access and use, I do not have
anything to hide’. This may be true, but it is certainly wrong. Data access
cannot be discussed without focusing on the reasons why completely free
access to data is not only impossible but also not desirable.
Since their beginnings in the 1960s and 1970s, with the rise of automat-
ed decision-making, efforts to protect data and privacy have tried to act on
this common misunderstanding of the equality of factual access to data
and the normative ‘nothing to hide’.2 This is because the risk that data pro-
tection is intended to prevent is easily undervalued.
A.
I.
* I would like to thank members of my staff Mona Winau for further research and
Charlotte Humpert for additional information and thorough reading. All refer-
ences were last checked on 7 August 2020.
1 The terms data and information are treated synonymously for the purposes of this
paper although the author is well aware that there is a substantial difference both
between them and to the concept of knowledge. This, however, does not play out
for the content of this paper.
2 Spiros Simitis, Gerrit Hornung and Indra Spiecker gen. Döhmann, in Spiros Simi-
tis, Gerrit Hornung and Indra Spiecker gen. Döhmann (eds), Datenschutzrecht. DS-
GVO mit BDSG (Nomos 2019) Einleitung paras 6–13; cf. Alan F. Westin, Privacy
and Freedom (Atheneum Press1967) 158–168; Jürgen Kühling and Johannes Raab,
in Jürgen Kühling and Benedikt Buchner (eds), Datenschutzgrundverordnung Kom-
mentar (C.H. Beck 2017) Einführung para. 37; Spiros Simitis, ‘Reviewing Privacy
in an Information Society’ (1987) 135 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 707,
709–710; Alan F. Westin, ‘Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for
the 1970’s: Part I-The Current Impact of Surveillance on Privacy’ (1966) 66
Columbia Law Review 1003, 1003. Similar to the dictum ‘nothing to hide’ is the
misunderstanding that ‘nobody is going to bother’; Jessica Litman, ‘Information
Privacy/Information Property’ (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 1283, 1285.
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The above assessment is based on two assumptions which contradict
this seemingly convincing finding: First, freely available information does
not mean equal use of the information. Not everyone who has access to da-
ta can also use it. So it is the availability of technology that determines the
potential threats. Secondly, there are effects of the use of data that the indi-
vidual does not control: If an individual’s data is being used to assess oth-
ers, then the effect on these others is not something included in the indi-
vidual’s decision to grant access. There is no direct interaction between the
person whose data is being used and the entity using the data, and there is
certainly no direct return between the use of data and the making accessi-
ble of it.
Data protection law is a core regulatory answer to data protection needs.
It addresses at its centre the information-based power asymmetry which
derives from the inequality of use and accessibility.3 However, it naturally
does not include all types of data. Rather, data protection law concentrates
on personal data, where the risk of imbalanced decisions is most promi-
nent, where the rationality of self-protection cannot necessarily be relied
upon and where the consequences for the well-being of society are most
pressing.
Data protection as a regulatory regime to link data and decision-making
The following insights into data access under the current EU legal regime
of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)4 concentrate on these
types of data. It should be noted, however, that there are many other data-
II.
3 Cf. Walter Schmidt, ‘Die bedrohte Entscheidungsfreiheit’ (1974) 29 Juristen-
Zeitung 241, 246; Lorna Stefanik, Controlling Knowledge – Freedom of Information
and Privacy Protection in a Networked World (Athabaska University Press 2011), 29;
Orla Lynskey, ‘Deconstructing data protection: the “added-value” of a right to data
protection in the EU legal order’ (2014) 63 International & Comparative Law
Quaterly 569, 589–590; See especially on privacy rights of defence against the state,
Serge Gutwirth and Paul De Hert, ‘Privacy, Data Protection and Law Enforcement:
Opactiy of the Individual and Transparency of Power’ in Eric Claes and others
(eds), Privacy and the Criminal Law (Intersentia 2006) 61, 72–74; Herbert Burkert,
Informationszugang und Datenschutz. Ein kanadisches Beispiel (Nomos 1992) 12. For
an overview of the scientific discourse in Germany at the beginning of data protec-
tion law, see Klaus Tiedemann and Christoph Sasse, Delinquenzprophylaxe, Kredit-
sicherung und Datenschutz in der Wirtschaft (Carl Heymanns Verlag 1973) 89–100.
4 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of
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protecting regimes present, such as the frequently discussed copyright law,
which is also covered in this volume, but also, much less focused on, the
protection of business and trade secrets or whistleblower protection,
which are also present in this volume.
Data protection is one important way to look at guidance for an overall
legal regime for access of data. The concept is based on the particular per-
spective on decision-making and the role information plays in it. Accord-
ing to this perspective, including the present difficulties in establishing an
information and knowledge society5 as well as the manifold perspectives
and consequences of legal intervention, data protection scholars are capa-
ble to deliver their own and integrating answers on pressing questions on
access of data. Though the full range of problems cannot be covered here,
questions that remain unsettled include: whether data can be the object of
services for the public (Daseinsvorsorge) and social participation, how
concepts of transparency versus secrecy can be evaluated and established,
what the consequences of ubiquitous computing and prolific availability
of information are on society and numerous levels of decision, how the
value, worth and accounting of information can be construed and legally
implemented, whether solidarity concepts require a sharing of data, espe-
cially in health care provision, how horizontal and vertical integration of
data and information technology can be guided, or who shall, in an inter-
national data transfer market, have the power to control data.
Most of the many approaches to solving these questions do not take into
account that access to data and access to the infrastructure to use and ex-
ploit this data are separate from each other. Data protection law, however,
offers solutions combining both venues because it is interested not only in
the information part but also in the results and purposes of the use of data.
Article 5 (1) lit. b GDPR, with the purpose limitation, makes that clear, as
does Article 20 GDPR, with the limitation of automated decision-making.
In the end, data protection law offers some concepts on how to deal with
the new central resource of data as the ‘new oil’, and how it can be used
for the public and private good without overburdening the individual. The
core element of data protection, however, that self-restriction and a moder-
ate use of data may be the way towards a sustainable, democracy-and-free-
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2018] OJ L127/2.
5 The term ‘knowledge society’ was coined by Helmut Wilke, Systemisches Wissens-
management (2nd edn, Lucius & Lucius 2001) 289.
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dom-driven society and economy, usually encounters a lot of opposition
and misconception.
The lack of control
The GDPR sees data as an important resource and an influencing factor
for decision-making. In this decision-oriented framework, data processing
has an impact both on the individual itself and on all groups of individuals
within society which are being judged on the basis of information. Typi-
cally, the most severely infringing types of data processing such as profil-
ing or scoring are achieved by transforming sets of individual data into
generalised information that is then re-applied to individuals by decision-
making. Therefore, power over information (and the technology to make
use of it) may cause structural disparity and imbalance between those who
are decided upon and those who decide with the aid of information and
information technology.
The latter are typically unable to control for the data reflected within
the decision, which strengthens the position of those using the informa-
tion to use all accessible information without normative barriers.6 Thus, a
decision may seem to be in accordance with accepted values but really is
not. Control over the substantive standards of a decision is therefore diffi-
cult, and control over the information input even more so. Thus a number
of GDPR provisions are intended to establish control and normative stan-
dards for the use of data, among them the requirement to use data primari-
ly directly gathered from the individual.
The GDPR also addresses the additional problem that maintaining con-
trol over the decision is typically difficult because individuals do not have
the resources to control the technological means of using and assessing in-
formation.7 If artificial intelligence is used to reach an administrative deci-
III.
6 Indra Spiecker gen. Döhmann, ‘Profiling, Big Data, Artificial Intelligence und So-
cial Media – Gefahren für eine Gesellschaft ohne effektiven Datenschutz’ in Walter
Hötzendörfer, Christof Tschohl and Franz Kummer (eds), International Trends in
Legal Informatics: Festschrift für Erich Schweighöfer (bpa media 2020) 345, 351–355.
7 Sebastian Bretthauer, ‘Verfassungsrechtliche Grundlagen, Europäisches und na-
tionales Recht’ in Louisa Specht and Reto Mantz (eds), Handbuch Europäisches und
deutsches Datenschutzrecht (C.H. Beck 2019) § 2 para. 2; Specifically on
Art. 22 GDPR see Philip Scholz, in Spiros Simitis, Gerrit Hornung and Indra
Spiecker gen. Döhmann (eds), Datenschutzrecht. DSGVO mit BDSG (Nomos 2019)
Art. 22 para. 3. Isak Mendoza and Lee A. Bygrave, ‘The Right Not to Be Subject to
Automated Decisions Based on Profiling’ (University of Oslo Faculty of Law Stud-
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sion, hardly any citizen will be able to attack this decision based on a cri-
tique of the functioning of the technology applied. Thus, means like the
data protection impact assessment procedure of Article 35 GDPR attempt
to limit the harm of uncontrolled use of potentially infringing technology.
The general answer of the GDPR regulatory regime
European data protection law offers a number of tools by which to assist
the data subject in controlling data flows and intransparent decision-mak-
ing. Without going into detail and with an eye on the special perspective
of this contribution to a data access regime, there should be a few core ele-
ments named for a common understanding when looking at exact regula-
tions on the access to data.
First, the GDPR intervenes as early and as long as possible and thus ac-
companies every aspect of data use. It does so by using a well-known tech-
nology-law instrument, the establishment of the principle of precaution
(Vorsorgeprinzip), thus reversing the burden of reasoning and potentially
proof in general: The data controller in many instances has to establish the
use and the exact purposes of the data use rather than the data subject hav-
ing to demonstrate risks and dangers.
The control of the data protection legal regime begins as early as possi-
ble and that is the moment when personal data leaves the sphere of the da-
ta subject’s immediate and sole control. This can be as early as the emer-
gence of data if this takes place in a social setting with others; it can also be
at a much later stage e.g. when entries made in a diary on a computer years
ago are exploited in the course of an administrative assessment of potential
foster parents. On the other side, in the life cycle of data,8 the GDPR also
controls for the decision and its outcome and in many instances takes the
potential consequences of the use of data into account when assessing the
lawfulness of an act of or a type of data processing.
IV.
ies, Research Paper Series No. 2017–20) 7–8 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf
m?abstract_id=2964855> accessed 22 July 2020.
8 Cf. Indra Spiecker gen. Döhmann, ‘Information Management’ in Peter Cane and
others (eds), The Oxford Handbook on Comparative Administrative Law (2020, forth-
coming).
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Secondly, the GDPR – and in this, it differs greatly from its predecessor,
the Data Protection Directive (DPD)9 – does not only rely on substantive
safeguards but establishes effective means of control and sanctions and in-
stitutionalises them.10 This can be seen in the clarified and increased tasks
and powers of the supervisory authorities, Articles 56 and 57 GDPR, but
also in the extensive set of sanctions now established under Articles 77 et
seq. GDPR or the possibility of representation of data subjects under Arti-
cle 80 GDPR. It also increases the pressure on data controllers by sharpen-
ing and furthering procedural safeguards such as a mandatory internal data
protection impact assessment for infringing or risky data processing ac-
cording to Article 35 GDPR, the duty to demonstrate according to Article
24 (1) GDPR or the duty to inform the data subject according to Articles
13 and 14 GDPR.11
9 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 Octo-
ber 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of person-
al data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31.
10 Jürgen Kühling and Mario Martini, ‘Die Datenschutz-Grundverordnung: Revolu-
tion oder Evolution im europäischen und deutschen Datenschutzrecht?’ (2016) 27
Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 448, 451–454; Benedikt Buchner,
‘Grundsätze des Datenschutzrechts, Datenschutzkontrolle’ in Marie-Theres Tin-
nefeld and others (eds), Einführung in das Datenschutzrecht, Datenschutz und Infor-
mationsfreiheit in europäischer Sicht (7th edn, De Gruyter 2020) 314–332; Quite pos-
itively forecasting an effective and consistent authority, Jan P. Albrecht, ‘How the
GDPR Will Change the World’ (2016) 2 European Data Protection Law Review
287, 289; opposing to Albrecht’s viewpoint, Sebastian J. Golla, ‘Is Data Protection
Law Growing Teeth? The Current Lack of Sanctions in Data Protection Law and
Administrative Fines under the GDPR’ (2017) 8 Journal of Intellectual Property,
Information Technology and E-Commerce Law 70, 77–78.
11 For an overview, see Peter Schantz, ‘Die Datenschutz-Grundverordnung – Beginn
einer neuen Zeitrechnung im Datenschutzrecht?’ (2016) 26 Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 1841, 1846–1847. On the data protection authority’s extended re-
sponsibilities and powers, Alexander Roßnagel, Datenschutzaufsicht nach der EU-
Datenschutz-Grundverordnung (Springer 2017); and the Europeanisation of supervi-
sory authority, Hielke Hijmans, ‘The DPAs and Their Cooperation: How Far Are
We in Making Enforcement of Data Protection Law More European?’ (2016) 2
European Data Protection Law Review 362. With regard to sanctions, Golla
(n. 10) 74–78. Concerning the implications for foreign companies and states,
Cedric Ryngaert and Mistale Taylor, ‘The GDPR as Global Data Protection Regu-
lation?’ (2020) 114 American Journal of International Law Unbound 5, 7. Point-
ing out the advantage of willingness to cooperate from an entrepreneur’s view-
point, Michael Wenzel and Tim Wybitul, ‘Vermeidung hoher Bußgelder und Ko-
operation mit Datenschutzbehörden’ (2019) Zeitschrift für Datenschutz 290; on
the increasing pressure on data processors in business, Tal Z. Zarsky, ‘Incompati-
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On this general understanding of what data protection law aims to
achieve, this paper will first develop some core elements of data protection
law without which the concept of access to data under the GDPR as the
legal regime of data protection in Europe cannot be understood properly
(B.). It will then point out the special qualities of data and information
that do not allow for regulatory frameworks typically used for market
goods and how data protection law implicitly takes these into account
(C.). With this general understanding, the different rights to access to data
under the GDPR (and partly national law) and their limits will be analysed
(D.). Guidelines for a data-protection-compatible regulatory regime are di-
rected towards an impact of these findings to legislators (E.) before the
chapter closes with a conclusion and an outlook (F.).
Prerequisites on Access under Data Protection Law
Personal Data as the Threshold for Application of Data Protection Regimes
As personal data is the core element to open up the wide regulatory regime
of data protection law, it is essential to understand what falls under this
terminology and what does not. A data-protection-friendly regulatory
regime of data access has to accept that a mixture of personal data and non-
personal data will lead to the application of the stricter data protection
regime. Thus, whenever there are some personal data elements within a
pool of data, any access to this pool in general has to follow the rules of the
GDPR.12
Article 4 (1) GDPR provides for a legal definition of ‘any information
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person’, clarifying that the
critical characteristic of identifiability is constituted if a person can directly
or indirectly be identified. Thus, additional knowledge and information
that needs to be accessed in order to identify a person has to be taken into
account in order to determine whether there is in particular a ‘reference
[…] such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online
identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological,
genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of the natural per-
B.
I.
ble: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data’ (2017) 47 Seton Hall Law Review 995,
1005.
12 Cf. Case C-131/12 Google Spain v AEPD and Mario Costeja González [2014]
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.
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son’. This legal definition makes it clear that the GDPR follows in the foot-
steps of the Data Protection Directive,13 creating in general a large scope of
applicability of data protection law as additional information has to be tak-
en into account when determining whether data is personal data or not. In
other words: Even if data does not immediately refer to an individual, it
can still fall under the regime of the GDPR if additional data allows for a
connection.
What remains unclear, however, is how much additional information
has to be taken into account and whether or not this additional informa-
tion must be accessible by the data controller. This ongoing feud over
whether to take a more objective or more subjective approach14 has been
in parts decided by the ECJ in the Breyer case.15 There, the ECJ ruled that
dynamic IP addresses are typically considered to be personal data unless
the identification is prohibited by law or access to the combination of data
is only possible if totally disproportionate measures have to be taken. This
could be redefined as an objective perspective with subjective elements/
restrictions: In general all additional information which can legally and
13 There is no difference between the wording of Art. 4 (1) GDPR and
Art. 2 lit. a) DPD in the English version. The altered wording in the German ver-
sion from ‘bestimmt/bestimmbar’ to ‘identifiziert/identifizierbar’ does not have
any practical implications; Moritz Karg, in Spiros Simitis, Gerrit Hornung and In-
dra Spiecker gen. Döhmann (eds), Datenschutzrecht. DSGVO mit BDSG (Nomos
2019) Art. 4 No. 1 para. 6; Stefan Ernst, in Boris P. Paal and Daniel A. Pauly (eds),
Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (2nd edn, Beck 2018) Art. 4
No. 1 para. 3; Tina Krügel, ‘Das personenbezogene Datum nach der DSGVO’
(2017) Zeitschrift für Datenschutz 455, 455–456.
14 Karg (n. 13) Art. 4 No. 1 paras 58–59; supporting the subjective approach, Mark J.
Taylor, ‘Data Protection: Too Personal to Protect’ (2006) 3 SCRIPTed (Journal)
71, 79–80; Worku G. Urgessa, ‘The Protective Capacity of the Criterion of Identi-
fiability under EU Data Protection Law’ (2016) 2 European Data Protection Law
Review Journal 521, 522; concerning the subjective approach in The UK Data
Protection Act 1998, Taylor (ibid) 79; about the former version of the German
Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG), Paul Voigt, ‘Datenschutz bei Google’ (2009)
Multimedia und Recht 377, 379.
15 Case C-582/14 Patrick Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2016]
ECLI:EU:C:2016:779.
Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, ‘The Breyer Case of the Court of Justice of the
European Union: IP Addresses and the Personal Data Definition’ (2017) 3 Euro-
pean Data Protection Law Review Journal 130, 131, 137. With regard to
assignability of the Breyer jurisprudence to Art. 4 (1) GDPR, Jens Brauneck, ‘DSG-
VO: Neue Anwendbarkeit durch neue Definition personenbezogener Daten?’
(2019) 30 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 680, 682–688; Krügel (n.
13) 455–456.
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not totally against all proportionality be accessed has to be taken into ac-
count, and this includes information which the data controller might not
actually retrieve. This leaves a wide range of application of the GDPR to
many sets of data, although at first sight they might not seem to be person-
al data. This should be considered when developing a regime for wide data
access: Much data processing is thus restricted by the GDPR.
Lawfulness of Data Processing and Procedural Requirements in combination
One of the core elements of data protection law is that any type of data
processing has to be justified.16 Article 6 (1) GDPR (and Article 9 GDPR
for data with a high potential of discrimination, e.g. health data, racial or
political data) provides for legal grounds, among them consent of the data
subject but also overriding public interests. Nevertheless, despite wide pos-
sibilities for data processing of personal data, the GDPR also provides for a
number of additional requirements and restrictions of these data process-
ings. One could describe this process as a continuous pendulum: Requir-
ing justification lets the pendulum swing in one direction, allowing wide
justifications then lets it sway in the other direction, the procedural safe-
guards send it back again, and the possibilities for loosening these safe-
guards allow it to turn in the other direction, once more.
II.
16 Jan P. Albrecht, in Spiros Simitis, Gerrit Hornung and Indra Spiecker gen.
Döhmann (eds), Datenschutzrecht. DSGVO mit BDSG (Nomos 2019) Art. 6 para. 1;
Eike M. Frenzel, in Boris P. Paal and Daniel A. Pauly (eds), Datenschutz-Grund-
verordnung, Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (2nd edn, C.H. Beck 2018) Art. 6 para. 1;
Benedikt Buchner and Thomas Petri, in Jürgen Kühling and Benedikt Buchner
(eds), Datenschutzgrundverordnung Kommentar (C.H. Beck 2017) Art. 6 para. 1. In
this respect, data protection law takes an exceptional position compared to other
information obtained regulatory approaches, Spiecker gen. Döhmann (n. 8) sec.
33.6.1. Alexander Roßnagel speaks out against the frequently used term ‘ban with
an exemption option’ in this context: Alexander Roßnagel, ‘Kein “Verbot-
sprinzip” und kein “Verbot mit Erlaubnisvorbehalt” im Datenschutzrecht’ (2019)
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1. About the intrusive character of data process-
ing, see Herke Kranenborg, ‘Article 8 – Protection of Personal Data’ in Steve
Peers and others (eds), The EU Charter on Fundamental Rights. A Commentary
(Hart Publishing 2014) Nos 08., 08.88 – 08.90; cf. Case C-131/12 Google Spain v
AEPD and Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para. 86.
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Data Protection for both private and public data processing
Considering the broadness of the application of the GDPR and thus the
general standards of data protection, the GDPR creates an extensive frame-
work which regulates in an intensive way the processing of data. However,
it should be seen that the GDPR differentiates in many regards – in con-
trast to the previous DPD – between private and public use of data.17
The regulation recognises that there are different interests involved.
While private data processing is an expression of the freedom and liberties
of the individual and thus might happen arbitrarily and completely in the
own interest of both the data subject and the data controller, public (state)
processing of data is in general bound by the common good and by the du-
ty to serve a public interest. Public data processing is thus under a double
requirement for justification, arising firstly from the special dangers and
risks associated with the processing of data, but secondly also deriving
from the special obligation of the state to serve the interests of the people.
Data as a special good and its effect on regulation
Without going into detail in regard to the special topic of this contribu-
tion, data protection law also takes into account that personal data has spe-
cial qualities. Any type of regulation of personal data – be it a restriction or
be it wide access to unlimited use of it – has to take this into account. Data
and information cannot be treated as any other good, commodity or con-
tent of contractual relations.
This is the case, for one thing, because information and privacy are com-
mon goods in the economic sense.18 This means that there exists no rivalry
III.
C.
17 Kühling and Raab (n. 2) Einführung para. 78. Art. 6 (1) lit. c and lit. e GDPR
specifically address data processing in public responsibility. Emphasising broad
flexibility clauses, Julian Wagner and Alexander Benecke, ‘National Legislation
within the Framework of the GDPR’ (2016) 2 European Data Protection Law Re-
view 353, 354–355. Pointing out the lack of a comprehensive data protection ad-
ministrative law, Philipp Reimer, ‘Verwaltungsdatenschutzrecht’ (2018) Die Öf-
fentliche Verwaltung 881, 881–882; more generally concerning different regula-
tory approaches in information law, Spiecker gen. Döhmann (n. 8) Introduction.
18 They are also experience goods, but this aspect shall not be further pursued in the
course of this paper.
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in consumption, and also no excludability from consumption of the
good:19 Anyone may use it, may use it again and may pass it on without
the originator of the information being able to prevent this or control the
flow of information. As a common good can be used multiple times by
multiple users it is difficult to make such a good marketable: Market fail-
ure and enforcement deficits are typical effects in regard to such a good.20
For regulatory impact, this means that legal protection of common goods
has to start at the beginning of any transfer as any later use of information
can hardly be traced. This is one of the reasons why data protection law
does not only take into account specific risky handling of data but every
step of data processing.
Personal information and privacy are special goods for another reason,
as well. Information on a person is not something that cannot be separated
from the person it is connected to and to the personality of the person. In-
formation is never free of context. The individual traits and characteristics
of a person are inseparable from the personal content of information on
this person. Of course, some such links are stronger than others: A diary
reveals more about a person than the name or the employer of that person.
However, as context always matters, even those seemingly unimportant as-
pects of a person and his or her personality can, together with other infor-
19 See the report of the German Federal Justice Minister’s conference, ‘Arbeits-
gruppe ‘Digitaler Neustart’ der Konferenz der Justizminister und Justizminis-
terinnen der Länder‘ (2017) 30 <https://jm.rlp.de/fileadmin/mjv/Jumiko/Fruehjah
rskonferenz_neu/Bericht_der_AG_Digitaler_Neustart_vom_15._Mai_2017.pdf>
accessed 26 July 2020. Regarding the characters and difference between property
rights and personality rights (192–194), giving a review of the discoursive
question whether European Data Protection Law under GDPR contains property
right aspects (199–204) and depicting the non-absolute character of data protec-
tion rights (201–202), Henry Pearce, ‘Personality, Property and Other Provoca-
tions: Exploring the Conceptual Muddle of Data Protection Rights under EU
Law’ (2018) 4 European Data Protection Law Review 190. Arguing for a properti-
sation of data protection law while recognising privacy as a common good, Paul
M. Schwartz, ‘Property, Privacy, and Personal Data’ (2004) 117 Harvard Law Re-
view 2056, 2084–2090. Pointing out the property-derived rights under GDPR, Ja-
cob M. Victor, ‘The EU General Data Protection Regulation: Toward a Property
Regime for Protecting Data Privacy’ (2013) 123 Yale Law Journal 513.
20 See Alan Randall, ‘The Problem of Market Failure’ (1983) 23 Natural Resources
Journal 131; David Bollier, Silent Theft: The Privat Plunder of Our Common Wealth
(Routledge 2013) 7; Richard J. Sweeney, Robert D. Tollison and Thomas D. Wil-
lett, ‘Market Failure, the Common-Pool Problem, and Ocean Resource Exploita-
tion’ (1974) 17 Journal of Law and Economics 179, 180. Criticising the ideas of
property of facts from a US-law viewpoint, Jessica Litman, ‘Information Privacy/
Information Property’ (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 1283, 1294, 1297.
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mation, become very revealing as to individuality. This makes clear why in
the German constitutional understanding of data protection rights (ie the
right to informational self-determination21) there is a direct link to the
constitutional guarantee of the person’s dignity in Article 1 (1) of the Basic
Law (Grundgesetz).
The consequences of this special character trait of information and pri-
vacy are – in legal terms – manifold. They include, first, that a property-
based approach, similar to the US approach based on trespass,22 is incom-
patible with this understanding.23 Thus, the construction of data protec-
tion rights and privacy rights as property rights which can be sold and
bought does not fit this quality of information. Secondly, further conclu-
sions cannot be drawn from this concept of property-based information
rights: A ‘data donation’ as has been discussed lately24 is impossible under
such conditions as no person is able to disconnect the information from its
21 Cf. German Federal Constitutional Court, 15 September 1983, Case 1 BvR
209/83, (1983) 65 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 1 – Volk-
szählung.
22 Cf. Patricia Mell, ‘Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Prop-
erty in the Electronic Wilderness’ (1996) 11 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1,
34; James Q. Whitman, ‘The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus
Liberty’ (2004) 113 Yale Law Journal 1151, 1211–1213; Russell L. Weaver and
Steven I. Friedland, ‘Privacy and the Fourth Amendment’ in Dieter Dörr and Rus-
sell L. Weaver (eds), Perspectives on Privacy – Increasing Regulation in the USA,
Canada, Australia and European Countries (De Grutyer 2014) 1, 2–3, 5 (giving an
overview about the modified comprehension in jurisprudences reacting to tech-
nological progress), 5–17; Indra Spiecker gen. Döhmann, ‘Datenschutz in der
Globalisierung – Mission Impossible in einer Welt der Technikzukünfte unter
Einwirkung einer neuen Datenschutz-Grundverordnung?’ in Thomas Dreier and
Indra Spiecker gen. Döhmann (eds), Informationsrecht@KIT – 15 Jahre Zentrum für
Angewandte Rechtswissenschaft (KIT Scientific Publishing 2015) 63, 77; Schantz
(n. 11) Art. 45 paras 41–43; about the lack of a comprehensive regulatory ap-
proach and the concept of privacy protection in specific areas, Paul M. Schwartz,
‘Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace’ (1999) 52 Vanderbilt Law Review 1607,
1632–1634; Vera Bergelson, ‘It’s Personal but Is It Mine – Toward Property Rights
in Personal Information’ (2003) 37 UC Davis Law Review 379, 391–393.
23 Differentiating between the perception of data protection as a privacy law and
property, the latter originated from USA, Henry Pearce, ‘Personality, Property
and Other Provocations: Exploring the Conceptual Muddle of Data Protection
Rights under EU Law’ (2018) 4 European Data Protection Law Review 190, 197–
198. From Pearce’s point of view the conception of data protection which the
GDPR establishes is not incompatible with a property-right approach all together,
but can rather be described as quasi-property rights, 204–205.
24 The German public health authority (Robert Koch Institute) provides an app that
collects personal data (residence, height, weight) and has vital data transferred
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personal connection. The only way to do this is to anonymise – and then
data donation will no longer be necessary because there will be no person-
al data left. On the other hand, in contradiction to the concept of informa-
tion/data protection as a property right, the present privacy- and personali-
ty right-oriented concept also allows for an acceptance of data to be rarely
only one person’s data. As the German Constitutional Court put it, human
beings are social beings,25 and as such, they continuously distribute data
about themselves, and most of this information is connected to others.
Another consequence of this special character trait of information is the
duration of this bond between person and information: Typically, there is
a lifelong connection to all information acquired during the lifespan of a
person. Age of data or the time span between the emergence of an infor-
mation and its use do not in general diminish the power of data protection
or privacy.26
Finally, in reference to an earlier observation: Information typically has
no value on its own. It is a resource for making decisions: By incorporating
the information present, decision-makers can act on it. However, this rela-
tionship between decisions and information only works one way, if at all.
It is typically impossible to deduct from a decision the information and the
sources which went into it. This has two effects: One is that the price for
information is highly dependent on the individual preferences and con-
texts of the decision-maker; the other is that control of the flow of informa-
tion is highly difficult to obtain as it would require exact knowledge not
only of the information present and its sources but also of the normative
values of the decision and the evaluation of potentially uncertain informa-
tion.
from smart watches or activity trackers. The authority uses the app user’s ‘donat-
ed’ data for research improving the calculation basis for early recognition of
Covid-19 infections. See <https://corona-datenspende.de/>; <www.aerzteblatt.de/n
achrichten/112636/RKI-Mehr-als-eine-halbe-Million-Teilnehmer-bei-Datenspende-
App>; <www.heise.de/ct/artikel/Corona-Datenspende-App-des-RKI-4704898.htm
l>; <www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-germany-tech/germany-launc
hes-smartwatch-app-to-monitor-coronavirus-spread-idUSKBN21P1SS> accessed
27 July 2020.
25 Cf. German Federal Constitutional Court, 15 September 1983, Case 1 BvR
209/83, (1983) 65 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 1 – Volk-
szählung.
26 This was recognised by the CJEU in the Google Spain decision; Case C-131/12
Google Spain v AEPD and Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.
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All three specialties of information and privacy lead to one core conclu-
sion: It is impossible for the individual, the so-called data subject,27 to en-
act effective control over the use and processing of his or her data. This is
the case, first, because of the huge amount of data in connection with his
or her person, second, because of the huge amount of data processing in-
volving personal data that goes unnoticed due to the quality of informa-
tion as non-rival and non-excludable in consumption, and third, because
of the decision to not reveal which information went into building the da-
ta set.
Data Access under the GDPR
Access and Data Processing
According to Article 4 (2) GDPR, data processing covers all and any opera-
tion or even sets of operations. Examples given of data processing include
‘collection, recording’, ‘retrieval’, ‘disclosure’ and ‘dissemination or other-
wise making available’. Thus, any access to personal data is covered by data
processing under the GDPR. It does not matter whether this access is pro-
vided by activities performed on the side of the data subject (e.g. disclosure
or submittal) or by activities on the side of the data controller (e.g. by trac-
ing). Similarly, it does not play a role for the categorisation as processing
whether the access to the data is granted by free will or whether it is exer-
cised in the course of force majeur or vested powers, e.g. by the state.
Right to access of data under the GDPR
The GDPR contains a number of rights and obligations which can be cate-
gorised as granting access to personal data. They can be clustered accord-
ing to the claimant: With most rights, the data subject is the one to de-
mand access; with some rights a third party may do so.
D.
I.
II.
27 Art. 4 (1) GDPR.
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Rights to access by the data subject, Article 15 GDPR
The most prominent right to access of personal data is that regulated in Ar-
ticle 15 GDPR: It is considered to be the backbone of the power of the data
subject: Only if it is known what is saved and how personal data has been
processed can the data subject claim any further rights. Therefore, trans-
parency is the first step, but it does not suffice to enact control.
Article 15 GDPR also specifies how far the right of access can be extend-
ed: According to Article 15 (1) GDPR, certain information typically has to
be revealed on request beyond the fact that there is data processing taking
place, e.g. the recipients of data transfers, the duration of data storage, the
source of the data if it was not collected from the data subject etc.28
What is problematic, however, is whether the right to access under Arti-
cle 15 GDPR also extends to data which has been recombined with other
data, e.g. for the purposes of profiling or scoring where the result of the
profile or the score may not necessarily be connected to the data subject.29
It also remains questionable whether the precise technology used for
these analyses may be covered by the right to access. Article 15 (1) lit. h
GDPR states, of the right to access in regard to automated decision-mak-
ing, that the claim also includes ‘meaningful information about the logic
involved’ as well as consequences and significance.30 Thus, in a first step
1.
28 Matthias Bäcker, in Jürgen Kühling and Benedikt Buchner (eds), Datenschutz-
Grundverordnung, Bundesdatenschutzgesetz Kommentar (2nd edn, Beck 2018)
Art. 15 para. 9; Alexander Dix, in Spiros Simitis, Gerrit Hornung and Indra
Spiecker gen. Döhmann (eds), Datenschutzrecht. DSGVO mit BDSG (Nomos 2019)
Art. 15 para. 16. Art. 15 (1) GDPR contains a right to an affirmation of process
and a right of access to all processed personal data, supplemented by the right to
be provided with a copy in Art. 15 (3) GDPR. It is limited by rights and freedoms
of others (Art. 15 (4) GDPR) and in case of a ‘manifestly unfounded or excessive’
request (Art. 12 (5) GDPR), Dix (n. 28) Art. 15 paras 12–17, 28–35; a controversy
arose about the right’s scope. See Philipp Zikech and Daniel Sörup, ‘Der Auskun-
ftsanspruch nach Art. 15 DSGVO’ (2019) Zeitschrift für Datenschutz 239. React-
ing to the decision of Regional Labour Court (Landesarbeitsgericht) Baden-Würt-
temberg, 20 December 2018, Case 17 Sa 11/18, (2018), Stefan Brink and Daniel
Joos, ‘Reichweite und Grenzen des Auskunftsanspruchs und des Rechts auf
Kopie’ (2019) Zeitschrift für Datenschutz 483; Tim Wybitul and Isabelle Brahms,
‘Welche Reichweite hat das Recht auf Auskunft und auf Kopie nach Art. 15  DSG-
VO? – Zugleich eine Analyse des Urteils des LAG Baden-Württemberg vom
20 December 2018’ (2019) Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 672.
29 For further references see Dix (n. 28) Art. 15 No. 25 para. 58.
30 Giving an overview on the academic debate on a ‘right to explanation’ granted by
the GDPR, Diana Dimitrova, ‘The Right to Explanation under the Right of Ac-
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the data subject may indeed claim the information about the applied tech-
nology. This does not, however, include an explanation of the precise deci-
sion-making method. Also, the phrasing of Article 15 (1) lit. h GDPR
shows that the envisaged consequences have to be revealed and thus not
the exact use and the exact consequences. While the claim is precise in re-
gard to the technology, it remains fuzzy in regard to the application of the
information.
The right to access does not include, however, the requirement that all
material be released in which the personal data is present.31 Right to access
is not the same as a right to the inspection of records or files.32 This is in
accordance with the provision of Article 15 (3) GDPR (right to a copy of
the personal data), as that provision allows for presentation of the data in
cess to Personal Data: Legal Foundations in and Beyond the GDPR’ (2020) 6
European Data Protection Law Review 211, 214–126. Including systematic data
and factors of automated decision making, Bäcker (n. 28) Art. 15 para. 27; Dix
(n. 28) Art. 15 No. 25 para. 16; similar, Bryce Godman and Seth Flaxman, ‘Euro-
pean Union regulations on algorithmic decision-making and a “right to explana-
tion”’ (2016) Oxford Internet Institute <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.08813.pdf>
accessed 29 July 2020. Supporting a wide reading containing logic and systematic
data that is not immediately personal counteracting the discriminatory potential
of automated decision-making, Johanna Mazur, ‘Right to Access Information as a
Collective-Based Approach to the GDPR’s Right to Explanation in European
Law’ (2018) 11 Erasmus Law Review 178, 183–184. Recognising a right to expla-
nation rooted in Art. 15 GDPR in conjunction with Art. 22 and Recital 71 GDPR
while evincing legal and technical limitations, Maja Brkan and Grégory Bonnet,
‘Legal and Technical Feasibility of the GDPR’s quest for Explanation on Algorith-
mic Decisions: Of Black Boxes, White Boxes and Fata Morganas’ (2020) 11 Euro-
pean Journal of Risk Regulation 18, 20–22. Arguing that a right to explanation of
specific decisions cannot be derived from the right to access, Sandra Wachter,
Brent Mittelstadt and Luciano Floridi, ‘Why a Right to Explanation of Automated
Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation’
(2017) 7 International Data Privacy Law 76, 83–90. Criticising the focus of discus-
sion on a right to explanation as a core solution for opacity of automated deci-
sions and algorithmic faults, Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale, ‘Slave to the Al-
gorithm: Why a Right to an Explanation Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are
Looking for’ (2017–2018) 16 Duke Law & Technology Review 18, 24–61.
31 Dix (n. 28) Art. 15 para. 17. Concerning inspection of records in German taxation
procedure, Anna Sophie Poschenrieder, ‘Ein Recht auf Auskunft begründet kein
Akteneinsichtsrecht. Grenzen von Art. 15 DSGVO im Besteuerungsverfahren’
(2020) 1–2 Deutsches Steuerrecht 21, 23.
32 Dix (n. 28) Art. 15 para. 17.
Indra Spiecker genannt Döhmann
190 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748924999-175, am 29.10.2021, 10:20:10
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
that format in which they are present with the data controller.33 The right
to obtain a copy in Article 15 (3) GDPR allows for additional control by
the data subject because the right to access according to Article 15 (1)
GDPR by itself would require the data subject to accept the information
presented by the data controller while the copy of the data undergoing
processing allows for further, including technological, conclusions.34
Finally, the result of the right of access is that the data subject may be
able to enact a better judgment on further steps of action, e.g. a complaint
to the supervisory authority or a request for erasure. The right of access is
not originally meant to enable the data subject to make use of this data.35
It remains questionable, therefore, whether the right to access gives the da-
ta subject the right to use the data from the data controller in an unrestrict-
ed way,36 as trade and business secrets or at least trade and business inter-
ests of the data controller may be affected if the data subject makes use of
the accessed data. It is clear, however, that the data subject may use the
right of access and all information received under it in data-breach-related
33 Touching upon synchronous extent and difference in presentation format as re-
gards right of access from Art. 15 (1), Malte Engeler and Daniel Quiel, ‘Recht auf
Kopie und Auskunftsanspruch im Datenschutzrecht’ (2019) Zeitschrift für Daten-
schutz 2201, 2202–2203; with reference to the CJEU’s decision relating to
Art. 12 lit.a DPD (Joined Cases Case C- 141/12 and C-372/12 YS v Minister voor Im-
migratie, Integratie en Asiel, and Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel v M, S
[2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2081), Tim Wybitul and Isabelle Brahms, ‘Welche Reich-
weite hat das Recht auf Auskunft und das Recht auf eine Kopie nach Art. 15 I DS-
GVO?’ (2019) Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 672, 674–676. Dissenting, Sascha
Kremer, ‘Das Auskunftsrecht der betroffenen Person in der DSGVO’ (2018) Com-
puter und Recht 560, 564 para. 34.
34 Dissent exists on the basis of the exact nature and scope of the relationship be-
tween the right of access and the right of being provided a copy. Outlining that
both are autonomous rights, Stefan Brink and Daniel Joos, ‘Reichweite und Gren-
zen des Auskunftsanspruchs und des Rechts auf Kopie’ (2019) Zeitschrift für
Datenschutz 483, 434; Bäcker (n. 28) Art. 15 para. 39; dissenting, Philipp Zikesch
and Thorsten Sörup, ‘Der Auskunftsanspruch nach Art. 15 DSGVO’ (2019)
Zeitschrift für Datenschutz 239, 239–240; Dix (n. 28) Art. 15 para. 28.
35 Rather, it serves as a security for transparency and law enforcement: Boris P. Paal,
in Boris P. Paal and Daniel A. Pauly (eds), Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Bundes-
datenschutzgesetz (2nd edn, Beck 2018) Art. 15 para. 3; Bäcker (n. 28) Art. 15 para.
5; Margot E. Kaminski, ‘Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach
to Algorithmic Accountability’ (2019) 92 Southern California Law Review 1529,
1587.
36 The GDPR does not put the data subject’s legal position in concrete terms, cf. An-
gela Sobolciakova, ‘Right of Access under GDPR and Copyright’ (2018) 12
Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology 221, 226–227.
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activities, ie information of the supervisory authority or a request for era-
sure. This right of use against private parties is derived not only indirectly
from the purpose of Article 15 GDPR to enable control that needs to be
effective but also from Article 6 (1) lit. f GDPR: The interests of the data
controller cannot override the interests of the data subject in the case of a
violation.
Right to data portability, Article 20 GDPR
The GDPR does not include many innovative regulatory tools in compari-
son to the DPD, but Article 20 GDPR certainly is one. As this provision
will be the core of another paper in this volume, this paper will only look
at the provision from the standpoint of access to data from the special per-
spective of data protection.
Article 20 GDPR is a clear sign that data protection is increasingly in-
cluding a consumer law perspective and also competition law aspects.37 Ar-
ticle 20 GDPR reacts to the special qualities of many service providers as
part of a larger network economy in which the economy of scale and scope
prevents functioning competition.38 Although this creates information
asymmetry and a lack of control by actors other than the data subject and
thus refers to some of the concerns of data protection law, the regulation
2.
37 Cf. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 242 rev. 01, (2017) 4 <http://ec.
europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=44099> accessed 27 July 2020; Inge
Graef, Martin Husovec and Nadezhda Purtova, ‘Data Portability and Data Con-
trol: Lessons for an Emerging Concept in EU Law’ (2018) 19 German Law Jour-
nal 1359, 1375; Helena Ursic, ‘Unfolding the New-Born Right to Data Portability:
Four Gateways to Data Subject Control’ (2018) 15 SCRIPTed (Journal) 42, 44.
38 Lucio Scudiero, ‘Bringing Your Data Everywhere: A Legal Reading of the Right
to Portability’ (2017) 3 European Data Protection Law Review 119, 119. See the
resolution of the German National Data Protection Conference, stating the role
of the data portability right in strengthening consumers’ positions and limiting
market-dominating positions: ‘Entschließung Marktmacht und informationelle
Selbstbestimmung, 88. Konferenz der Datenschutzbeaugten des Bundes und der
Länder, 08./09. Oktober 2014’, <www.bfdi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Publikationen/E
ntschliessungssammlung/DSBundLaender/88DSK_Marktmacht.html?nn=521722
8> accessed 27 July 2020. The right to data portability was originally targeted to
counteract so-called ‘lock-in effects’, especially in the context of social networking
platforms; Dix (n. 28) Art. 20 para. 1; Gerrit Hornung, ‘Eine Datenschutz-Grund-
verordnung für Europa? Licht und Schatten im Kommissionsentwurf vom
25. Januar 2012’ (2012) Zeitschrift für Datenschutz 99, 103.
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of a failing market order are not the prime interests of data protection.39
Article 20 GDPR now illustrates that data protection law is becoming
more and more a tool for other regulatory aspirations, as well, predomi-
nant among them consumer protection law and competition law.40
Under Article 20 GDPR, the data subject may request personal data
present with a data controller to be presented to him or her in such a way
that the data subject may transfer this data to another data controller. Arti-
cle 20 (2) GDPR clarifies that the data subject may also request a direct
transfer from the data controller to another party and need not undergo
the effort of becoming a mediator of services.
Thus, consumers are enabled to switch to another service provider with
minimal outlay and without loss of data. From an economic view obstacles
to market access are reduced, hence conditions of competition should be
ensured.41 The right to data portability, which includes access and transfer
services, aims to safeguard the data subject’s control over transmission be-
tween processors and to extend possibilities of self-determined decision-
39 Cf. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 242 rev. 01, (2017) 4 <http://ec.
europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=44099> accessed 27 July 2020.
40 For the latter cf. only the decision of the German antitrust agency (Bundeskartel-
lamt) against Facebook of February 2019; Bundeskartellamt, ‘Bundeskartellamt
prohibits Facebook from combining user data from different sources’ (6 February
2019) <www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/
2019/07_02_2019_Facebook.html> accessed 27 July 2020; as well as the two con-
secutive court decisions, Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court, 26 August 2019, VI
Kart 1/19 (V), (2019) Multimediarecht 742; German Federal Supreme Court,
23 June 2020, KVR-69/19, <https://www.bundesgerichtshof.de/SharedDocs/Presse
mitteilungen/DE/2020/2020080.html?nn=10690868> accessed 4 August 2020
(press release), in the end upholding the decision. Thus, data protection violations
were used as a shoehorn for competition law impact. See for comments on the
antitrust authority’s decision in the literature, Christina Etteldorf, ‘Data Protec-
tion from a Different Perspective: German Competition Authority Targets Face-
book’s Data Usage’ (2019) 5 European Data Protection Law Review 238; Irene
Lorenzo-Rego, ‘The Perspective of the Bundeskartellamt in the Evaluation of
Facebook’s Behaviour: Prior Considerations and Possible Impact’ (2019) 3 Euro-
pean Competition and Regulatory Law Review 100; Christoph Becher, ‘A Closer
Look at the FCO’s Facebook Decision’ (2019) 3 European Competition and Regu-
latory Law Review 116.
41 Michael Strubel, ‘Anwendungsbereich des Rechts auf Datenübertragbarkeit.
Auslegung des Art. 20 DS-GVO unter Berücksichtigung der Guidelines der Arti-
cle 29-Datenschutzgruppe’ (2017) Zeitschrift für Datenschutz 355, 355.
The legal framework for access to data from a data protection viewpoint
193https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748924999-175, am 29.10.2021, 10:20:10
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
making;42 simultaneously it is geared towards the goal of regulating mar-
ket monopoly.43
It should be noted that access to data under Article 20 GDPR is limited
to data which has been processed on the basis of either consent or a con-
tractual relationship (Article 20 (1) lit. a GDPR).
The exact impact of Article 20 GDPR is still unclear in regard to the
scope of data that is covered. It can be argued that only data which the data
subject has actively submitted to the data controller or knows that is being
processed is captured by the provision in order not to have Arti-
cle 20 GDPR become a super-right for any type of access to any type of da-
ta including evaluation or analysis data.44
Right to access of data by others than the data subject
Data protection law does protect data and it assures controllability, but it
does not hinder data processing. Rather, as any technology regulatory law,
it aims at avoiding the pitfalls of digitalisation. On the other hand, this
means data protection law is not preventing data processing that follows
certain procedures, restricts an overarching impact and remains within the
boundaries of the GDPR. Similarly, access of data is not something that
the GDPR explicitly forbids but rather restricts in the interest of the data
subject and common goals.
III.
42 Improving the data subject’s control of its personal data is mentioned in Recital
68 sentence 1 GDPR. See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 242
rev. 01, (2017) 6 <http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=44099>
accessed 27 July 2020; Ursic (n. 37) 44, 58–60; Graef, Husovec and Purtova (n. 37)
1365–1366.
43 Cf. Peter Schantz, ‘Die Datenschutz-Grundverordnung – Beginn einer neuen
Zeitrechnung im Datenschutzrecht?’ (2016) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1841,
1845; Ursic (n. 37) 58–59; cf. Graef, Husovec and Purtova (n. 37) 1365, 1369.
44 Dix (n. 28) Art. 20 para. 8; Tobias Herbst, in Jürgen Kühling and Benedikt Buchn-
er (eds), Datenschutzgrundverordnung Kommentar (C.H. Beck 2017) Art. 20 No. 11;
cf. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 242 rev. 01, (2017) 10–11
<http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=44099> accessed 27 July
2020; Scudiero (n. 38) 123; Heike Schweitzer, ‘Datenzugang in der
Datenökonomie: Eckpfeiler einer neuen Informationsordnung’ (2019)
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 569, 574. Giving an overview on
differing views, Kai von Lewinski, in Stefan Brink and Heinrich A. Wolff (eds),
Beck‘scher Online-Kommentar Datenschutzrecht (C.H.Beck 2020) Art. 20 paras 37–
48.
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Consequently, the GDPR includes a number of provisions under which
access to data can be obtained by parties other than the data subject. They
shall – in an overview – be the content of this section. It should be noted
that some of these provisions within the GDPR are not formulated as a di-
rect right which can be exercised, but are often more subtly included in
other provisions that deal with data processing as such. It should not be
forgotten that data access is a type of data processing, and as such some of
the provisions may yield data access in a much broader sense than typically
associated with the data protection legal regime.
Consent or legal ground as basis for data processing, Article 6 (1) GDPR
Considering this data access as data processing the first and most impor-
tant way of gaining access to data protected under the GDPR would be to
adhere to the standards of the GDPR on data processing.
Most importantly, the GDPR contains a number of legitimate grounds
on which any type of data processing and thus also access to data can be
enabled. Within the more specific provisions of Article 6 GDPR, a number
of interests are weighted on a general level, taking into account special sit-
uations and special circumstances of typical data processing such as con-
tractual or legal obligations or also life-threatening situations. Article 6 (1)
lit. f GDPR, finally, opens desirable data processing for a more individu-
alised balancing test, at least between private data controllers.
It should be noted that this generalisation of balancing of interests in-
herent in Article 6 (1) GDPR takes into account interests on the side of the
data processor and potential further third parties who would profit from
the data processing and also interests on the side of the data subject and
potential further third parties which are affected by data processing.45 This
needs mentioning because the wording in Article 6 (1) GDPR is not al-
ways precise. For example, Article 6 (1) lit. f GDPR mentions on the one
hand ‘interests pursued by the controller or by a third party’ and on the
other hand ‘interests […] of the data subject’. Article 1 (1) GDPR, how-
ever, and the aforementioned general purpose of the GDPR, make clear
1.
45 Cf. Peter Schantz, in Stefan Brink and Heinrich A. Wolff (eds), Beck‘scher Online-
Kommentar Datenschutzrecht (C.H.Beck 2020) Art. 1 para. 7. Specific to
Art. 6 lit. f GDPR, Schantz (n. 11) Art. 6 paras 98–99, 101–102. A number of inter-
ests to be included are identified in Indra Spiecker gen. Döhmann, ‘A new frame-
work for information markets: Google Spain’ (2015) Common Market Law Re-
view 1033, 1046 et seq.
The legal framework for access to data from a data protection viewpoint
195https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748924999-175, am 29.10.2021, 10:20:10
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
that data processing not only has effects on the data subject but also on
third parties, who are judged on the basis of information gathered from in-
dividuals.46 Thus, on both sides of the scale not only the interests of the
parties involved directly, but also the effects on the whole, have to be inte-
grated. This explains why the data protection legal regime is not restricted
to certain elements within the information cycle but covers all steps and
also integrates effects going beyond individual legal interests and rights
and thus offers a comprehensive solution.
The GDPR points out manifold reasons, beyond a balancing of interests
in the individual case (typical of this is Artice 6 (1) lit. f GDPR), for grant-
ing access. Here, some little-regarded interests shall be pointed out, in par-
ticular as they are used as an argument why an extensive data access regime
is necessary. The GDPR opens personal data to these purposes so the need
for additional access rights is not necessarily pressing.
Foremost, one should mention Article 6 (1) lit. d GDPR which allows
for processing necessary ‘in order to protect the vital interests of the data
subject or of another natural person’. This covers a number of catastrophic,
pandemic or life-threatening situations in which data processing assists in
curing or at least relieving imminent dangers. Even if Article 9 (1) GDPR
is considered to be an additional threshold to health-related data,47 in a
number of cases the clause of Article 9 (2) lit. c GDPR covers even the pro-
cessing of special data and consent will always be possible according to Ar-
ticle 9 (2) lit. c and 9 (2) lit. a GDPR.
Likewise granting very wide access to data are the provisions of Article
6 (1) lit. c and lit. e GDPR when the purpose of the data processing can be
subsumed under the goal of furthering the common good. While the
meaning of Article 6 (1) lit. c and e GDPR is often confined to the opening
46 Cf. Schantz (n. 11) Art. 6 para.102; Joshua A. Fairfield and Christoph Engel, ‘Pri-
vacy as a Public Good’ (2015) 65 Duke Law Journal 385, 396–406.
47 Cf. Recital 51 sentence 5; Thomas Petri, in Spiros Simitis, Gerrit Hornung and In-
dra Spiecker gen. Döhmann (eds), Datenschutzrecht. DSGVO mit BDSG (Nomos
2019) Art. 9 No. 24; Marion Albers and Raoul-Darius Veit, in Stefan Brink and
Heinrich A. Wolff (eds), Beck’scher Online-Kommentar Datenschutzrecht (C.H.Beck
2020) Art. 20 paras 37–48; Thilo Weichert, in Jürgen Kühling and Benedikt Buch-
ner (eds), Datenschutzgrundverordnung Kommentar (C.H. Beck 2017) Art. 9 No. 4;
contradicting this, Frenzel (n. 16) Art. 9 No. 18; Alexander Schiff, in Eugen
Ehmann and Martin Selmayr (eds), DS-GVO Kommentar (C.H. Beck 2017) Art. 9
No. 9.
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clause for member state public interest laws it contains,48 its importance
initially rests in making data protection law applicable for all public inter-
est causes. Thus, although data access in the public interest has to keep in
mind the principle of proportionality and may not overburden data pro-
tection interests, it nevertheless can be an important reason why data pro-
cessing is possible.
A similarly hidden door opener to wide access of data is the legitimation
clause of Article 6 (1) lit. c GDPR, according to which a legal obligation
may cause the access to data. As the legal obligation has to be enacted ei-
ther by member-state or Union law, there has to be an overriding public
interest in this data access.49
Thus, under this clause, a number of data accesses in the public interest
can be legitimised, and considering the special interests in member states
or the Union, very specific interests can be served.
It should be stated, however, that public interests cannot be freely con-
strued and enacted without restrictions but are limited themselves. The
principle of proportionality50 has already been mentioned. Also, they need
to have a constitutional or other foundation within member state law, and
they may not be construed to violate the core principles of EU law, in par-
ticular Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter protecting the interests of data,
communication and privacy. Thus, ethical or other normative standards,
which are sometimes voiced to enable free data access, are not sufficient if
they do not have a legal foundation. This is especially true for arguments
such as a duty under a principle of solidarity which is raised as a reason for
48 Art. 6 (6 (2) and (3) GDPR contain opening clauses in regard to data processing
covered by lit. c. While there is some debate over the relationship and scope of the
opening clause(s) – cf. Alexander Roßnagel, in Spiros Simitis, Gerrit Hornung
and Indra Spiecker gen. Döhmann (eds), Datenschutzrecht. DSGVO mit BDSG
(Nomos 2019) Art. 6 No. 16–21; Albers and Veit (n. 47) Art. 6 No. 35; Julian Wag-
ner and Alexander Benecke, ‘National Legislation within the Framework of the
GDPR’ (2016) 2 European Data Protection Law Review 353, 354–355 –, its func-
tion as gateway for European or national legislation concerning data processing
by ‘public bodies’ is emphasised consistently; cf. Roßnagel (ibid.) Art. 6 para. 52;
Benedikt Buchner and Jürgen Kühling, in Jürgen Kühling and Benedikt Buchner
(eds), Datenschutzgrundverordnung Kommentar (C.H. Beck 2017) Art. 6 No. 83;
Wagner and Benecke (ibid) 354.
49 Cf. Roßnagel (n. 48) Art. 6 No. 1 para. 53.
50 Art. 6 (6 (3), fourth sentence GDPR. It should be noted that every legal obligation
governing the processing of personal data restricts the freedom under Art. 8 of the
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Art. 52 (1) second sentence of the Charter re-
quires its accordance with the principle of proportionality. See Roßnagel (n. 48)
Art. 6 No. 35.
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disclosure and access to information, e.g. in discussions on the legality and
desirability of data donations. Even in public health care systems, solidari-
ty is restricted to certain legal forms; in Germany, for instance, solidarity
can only be an argument in regard to the financial contribution within the
health care system but not in regard to the behaviour of patients and citi-
zens.51
Limitation of purpose and extension of purpose
There are a number of general principles within data protection law; some
are listed in Article 5 (1) GDPR.
The strict binding of data processing to a specific purpose
Under the DPD, the limitation of purpose was a stronghold of data protec-
tion principles. Under the GDPR, a similar and even more explicit formu-
lation can be found in Article 5 (1) lit. b GDPR.
The purpose limitation works two ways:52 It first binds every gathering
of personal data to a ‘specified, explicit and legitimate’ purpose. Thus, the
collection (and storage) of data for no specific reason is unlawful under the
GDPR.53 In a second step, the purpose limitation binds every consecutive
step following the original gathering of data to this exact same original
2.
a)
51 Cf Sec. 1 German Social Code (Sozialgesetzbuch) Part V. See in regard to health
insurance as a community of solidarity and the incompatibility of a behaviour-
based health insurance system with solidarity the German Ethic Board’s state-
ment, Deutscher Ethikrat, ‘Big Data und Gesundheit – Datensouveränität als in-
formationelle Freiheitsgestaltung’ (2018) 11, 230–237, <www.ethikrat.org/fileadm
in/Publikationen/Stellungnahmen/deutsch/stellungnahme-big-data-und-gesundhe
it.pdf> accessed 1 August 2020; Executive Summary: <www.ethikrat.org/fileadmin
/Publikationen/Stellungnahmen/englisch/opinion-big-data-and-health-summary.p
df> accessed 27 July 2020.
52 For a more detailed approach cf. Maximilian von Grafenstein, The Principle of Pur-
pose Limitation in Data Protection Laws (Nomos 2018) 425 et seq.
53 Roßnagel (n. 48) Art. 5 No. 72; Schantz (n. 45) Art. 5 No. 13; cf. Zarsky (n. 11)
1006. In regard to purpose under the DPD, Article 29 Data Protection Working
Party, WP 203 (2013) 15 <https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/o
pinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp203en.pdf> accessed 27 July 2020.
Indra Spiecker genannt Döhmann
198 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748924999-175, am 29.10.2021, 10:20:10
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
purpose.54 This is important to note, as a common misunderstanding55 be-
lieves a legitimation to be sufficient only for the first step of data process-
ing, which would then justify all further processing of this data, e.g. the
transfer of it to other parties.56 This is, however, not the case under the
GDPR.
In consequence, a situation is created by which the data subject may
control the flow of his or her data to the first controller and the more pre-
cise circumstances of processing. The purpose itself can be broader or
more narrow depending on the weight of infringement: The more infring-
ing the data processing potentially is, the more precisely must the purpose
be defined in order to allow a proper assessment.57
However, the GDPR contains two big exceptions from the strict princi-
ple of binding purpose which allow for further accessing of data despite
the boundaries from the purpose limitation. Both are integrated into Arti-
cle 5 (1) lit. b GDPR. The first one allows for secondary purposes for which
data can be processed, so-called compatible purposes, and the second one
allows for different entities and different purposes and reacts to the inter-
54 Herbst (n. 44) Art. 5 No. 38. Further issues of admissibility arise just in cases of
consecutive processing for another purpose (compatible/incompatible): Herbst
(ibid.) Art. 5 No. 22–24; Schantz (n. 45) Art. 5 No. 18–19; Roßnagel (n. 48) Art. 5
No. 92–93, 96–102; with respect to the DPD, see Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party, WP 203 (2013) 12 <https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/docume
ntation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp203en.pdf> accessed 27 July 2020;
cf. von Grafenstein (n. 52) 34.
55 Part of this misunderstanding arises from an unclear distinction between consec-
utive data processing for the original purpose and consecutive data processing for
a different, albeit potentially compatible purpose.
56 On the question of purpose-compatible further processing, Roßnagel (n. 48)
Art. 5 No. 97–99; Lukas Feiler, Nikolaus Forgo and Michaela Weigl, The EU Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Commentary (Globe Law and Business
Ltd 2018) Art. 6 No. 14; Jürgen Kühling and Mario Martini, ‘Die Datenschutz-
Grundverordnung: Revolution oder Evolution im europäischen und deutschen
Datenschutzrecht?’ (2016) 27 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 448,
451. For instance, in US law, the US Federal Information Privacy Law (esp. FR-
CA) basically legitimises data processing for a wide range of purposes, exempting
processing for employment purposes or when medical data is contained, where
consent by an opt-in mechanism is required; Paul M. Schwartz and Karl-Nikolaus
Peifer, ‘Transatlantic Data Privacy Law’ (2017) 106 Georgetown Law Journal 115,
153.
57 Schantz (n. 45) Art. 5 No. 15; with respect to the DPD: Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party, WP 203 (2013) 15–16 <https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/docu
mentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp203en.pdf> accessed
27 July 2020.
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ests of ‘archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical re-
search purposes or statistical purposes’ within the meaning and the bound-
aries of Article 89 GDPR when these are in accordance with the original
purpose.
Compatible other purposes
The GDPR – as did the DPD – distinguishes in principle two types of pur-
poses: One type is the original purpose, which may allow for a number of
consecutive and parallel instances of data processing once data has been
legally obtained under this purpose if further steps are necessary to achieve
this purpose. The second type contains all other purposes that may occur
with the data which has been obtained under another purpose. This other
purpose-oriented data processing is not justified under the original legiti-
mation of the data processing. As a consequence, any data processing for
such an ‘other purpose’ would be unlawful if it could not be justified by
itself, and this would require a complete new testing.
The GDPR now opens up another venue by a fiction: According to Arti-
cle 5 (1) lit. b GDPR’s difficult terminology, there exists a ‘compatible pur-
pose’. This is, in the above typology, a different purpose from the original
one.58 However, the legal fiction declares such compatible purposes to be
covered by the original purpose and thus legal under the same legal
grounds and adherence to procedural standards.59 A change of purpose is
thus legally harmless.
Article 6 (4) GDPR gives guidelines as to which factors should be taken
into account in order to assess whether a new purpose is compatible, ie the
context and the relationship between data subject and data controller (Ar-
b)
58 Schantz (n. 45) Art. 5 Nr 18; Herbst (n. 44) Art. 5 No. 24, 42. Dissenting,
Roßnagel (n. 48) Art. 5 No. 97.
59 Further processing for a compatible purpose fulfilling GDPR requirements (e.g.
Art. 6 (6 (1) GDPR) is lawful, whereas consecutive processing for an incompatible
purpose is unlawful per se. See also Schantz (n. 45) Art. 5 No. 23; Herbst (n. 45)
Art. 5 No. 24, 28–29, 47–49; Jessica Bell and others, ‘Balancing Data Subjects'
Rights and Public Interest Research’ (2019) 5 European Data Protection Law Re-
view 43, 48; cf. the difference between the final version and the wording of Art. 5
lit. b GDPR in the Commission proposal interpreted by Article 29 Data Protec-
tion Working Party, WP 203 (2013) 36 <https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/doc
umentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp203en.pdf> accessed
31 August 2020. Dissenting, Roßnagel (n. 48) Art. 5 No. 96–99.
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ticle 6 (4) lit. b GDPR), or the consequences of the new purpose-oriented
data processing in comparison to the original intended consequences.
In the end, the establishment of compatible other purposes enlarges the
possibilities under which data can be accessed because a transfer of data to
another entity and another data controller may well be in accordance with
the new purpose. Once legally obtained, data may then be continuously
used for other purposes, as well. The new controller, however, should take
care to inform itself about the restrictions of the original data processing,
as those restrictions still apply under the new purpose.60 This also covers
the event that the original purpose is fulfilled. In this case, the justification
for the compatible purpose also ceases to apply.
Archiving, Research and Statistics as privileged purposes
The second exception is also rooted in Article 5 (1) lit. b GDPR itself. It re-
acts to a special conflict of interests between the privacy interests of a data
subject and the interests in continuous use of personal data for archiving,
research and statistics.61
All three of these purposes are declared to be compatible purposes per
se; further limitations are not expressed. In particular, Article 6 (4) GDPR
does not apply and thus no individual balancing of interests takes place;
the legitimation for the original processing is extended to the processings
for these purposes.
The GDPR recognises this flaw and refers to Article 89 GDPR, accord-
ing to which any processing for these purposes ‘shall be subject to appro-
priate safeguards’ (Article 89 (1) GDPR). These include the requirement to
anonymise as early as possible (Article 89 (1), last sentence, GDPR).
This provision in Article 5 (1) lit. b GDPR answers concerns from the
side of these interests, in particular research interests, which are often
raised when claiming that a comprehensive legal regime to free access of
c)
60 Cf. Roßnagel (n. 48) Art. 5 No. 93; Herbst (n. 45) Art. 5 No. 23; Frenzel (n. 16)
Art. 5 No. 29.
61 Alexander Roßnagel, ‘Datenschutz in der Forschung’ (2019) Zeitschrift für Daten-
schutz 157, 159; Thilo Weichert, ‘Die Forschungsprivilegierung in der DSGVO’
(2020) Zeitschrift für Datenschutz 18, 18–19. Disagreement remains on whether
the ground for privileged status is that these purposes are more highly valued,
Weichert (ibid.) 21, or that these purposes are not connected to the data subject,
Frenzel (n. 16) Art. 5 No. 32; Roßnagel (n. 48) Art. 5 No. 104. Taking both aspects
into account, Herbst (n. 45) Art. 5 para. 52.
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data has to be established. Frequently, it is argued in the interest of re-
search and scientific purposes, based on the assumption that data protec-
tion in this regard blocks access and processing, that the data protection
regime should be abandoned.62 These assumptions, however, do not show
a consideration for the purposes of the GDPR and they do not reflect the
GDPR’s standing towards research and scientific interests properly. These
purposes are privileged under the GDPR already, and this privilege allows
for wide access to existing personal data. Thus, a further research exemp-
tion or a further regulatory impact on research data is not necessary as
such. Rather, one can ask why there seems to be a desire for almost limit-
less access to personal data.
Any legal regime could make use of the opening clauses in Arti-
cle 89 (2) GDPR under which the member states (or EU law) may provide
for derogations from central rights of the data subject and thus encroach
even further on data subjects’ rights than the privilege itself does. This is
the case because the GDPR does not provide any obvious restriction on the
terminology or the exact purposes of research and science.63 So any type of
science – as obscure and controversial as it may be – could claim the privi-
lege of Article 89 GDPR.64
Considering the wide impact of statistical and scientific data processing,
a completely unlimited privileging would make the GDPR devoid of ap-
plication in an area where the risks of automated decision-making and of
wide use of personal data that it is intended to mitigate are particularly
present. The development, and often the application of Big Data, artificial
intelligence, ubiquitous computing, direct marketing, profiling, tracking
and scoring would all fall under statistical and/or research purposes and
62 E.g. Amy Kristin Sanders, ‘The GDPR One Year Later: Protecting Privacy or Pre-
venting Access to Information’ (2019) 93 Tulane Law Review 1229. Dissenting,
Kim Leonard Smouter-Umans, ‘GDPR and Research: Is the GDPR Eventually
Going to Be Good or Bad for Research?’ (2018) 2 International Journal for the Da-
ta Protection Officer, Privacy Officer & Privacy Counsel 29; Mike Hintze, ‘Sci-
ence and Privacy: Data Protection Laws and Their Impact on Research’ (2019) 14
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts 103, 121.
63 See Recital 159, sentences 2–3.
64 Cf. Carolyn Eichler, in Stefan Brink and Heinrich A. Wolff (eds), Beck’scher On-
line-Kommentar Datenschutzrecht (C.H.Beck 2020) Art. 89 paras 3, 7; Alexander
Roßnagel, ‘Datenschutz in der Forschung’ (2019) Zeitschrift für Datenschutz 157,
159; Benedikt Buchner and Marie-Theres Tinnefeld, in Kühling and Buchner,
Datenschutz-Grundverordnung (n. 28) Art. 89 No. 13. Contradicting this, Johannes
Caspar, in Simitis, Hornung and Spiecker gen. Döhmann, Datenschutzrecht (n. 2)
Art. 89 No. 25; Weichert (n. 61) 20–21.
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thus be widely exempted from the bindings of the purpose limitation and
many other restrictions of the GDPR.65 Therefore, restrictions of the pur-
poses of research for data access have to be derived from the inherent
meaning and structure of the GDPR itself.
The context of the exceptions help in construing a meaningful descrip-
tion of research and of statistics. That this is the goal of the GDPR itself,
rather than unlimited access and data processing for these purposes, can be
seen in the wording and the recitals. Archiving, the first of the three spe-
cial purposes, is restricted by the wording ‘public interest’. Also,
Recital 162, sentence 5, GDPR clarifies that statistical data may only be ag-
gregated data. The existence of Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of Fun-
damental Rights requires an interpretation which leaves ample room for
the general goals of the GDPR.66
Without being able to go further into detail in this paper, the seemingly
wide research clause has to be read as research in the public interest. This
does not prevent private research from profiting from Articles 89 and
5 (1) lit. b GDPR, as Recital 50 clarifies. But it does exclude a completely
commercialised research interested only in commercial use and the own
interest of the researching institution.67 Public interest can be demonstrat-
ed by other tools than public research, e.g. by being publicly funded, by
being made publicly available (e.g. by patents, licences for use) and by be-
ing published and transparent. Thus, any research which aims at remain-
ing a trade and business secret is not considered to be a compatible pur-
pose, just as private archiving or individualised statistical evaluation is not
covered.
In the end, this interpretation allows access to data for research purposes
in the common interest. It also enables data protection interests and re-
search interests to be aligned.
65 Similar, Johannes Caspar, in Simitis, Hornung and Spiecker gen. Döhmann,
Datenschutzrecht (n. 2) Art. 89, No. 17; Benedikt Buchner and Marie-Theres Tin-
nefeld, in Stefan Brink and Heinrich A. Wolff (eds), Beck’scher Online-Kommentar
Datenschutzrecht (C.H.Beck 2020) Art. 89 para. 12; Weichert (n. 61) 20–21. Al-
though arguing that the purpose limitation principle hinders big data uses signifi-
cantly, Tal Z. Zarsky assumes that commercial big data analyses cannot be includ-
ed in statistical purposes; Zarsky (n. 11) 1105–1007.
66 Cf. Johannes Caspar, in Simitis, Hornung and Spiecker gen. Döhmann, Daten-
schutzrecht. (n. 2) Art. 15 No. 32 et seq.
67 Ibid. Art. 15 No. 16; Weichert (n. 61) 20–21.
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Freedom of expression, media, press and journalistic purposes,
Article 85 (1) GDPR
Similarly, Article 85 (1) GDPR requires member states to establish a regu-
latory regime which enables freedom of expression as well as the institu-
tionalised human rights of the media from both an institutionalised and a
personal (‘journalistic purposes’) perspective.
Transparency and freedom of information, Article 85 (1) GDPR
Article 5 (1) lit. b GDPR, with its extension of the purpose limitation, priv-
ileges research, archiving and statistics in a particular way. However, in Ar-
ticle 85 (1) GDPR, the explicit necessity to reconcile data protection inter-
ests and interests in transparency and freedom of information is men-
tioned and left to member state law.
Guidelines for a regulatory regime in conformance with data protection
Having thus sketched the general framework of the GDPR on how person-
al data can be assessed, it becomes clear that data protection does not ex-
clude access to data. Rather, it aims at creating access to data in a way that
is socially and personally desirable and which – as the purpose limitation
illustrates – is limited and controllable. Thus, the GDPR restricts access to
data and creates an individualised approach without banning it or being
unfriendly towards data processing. Rather, this approach is able to take
into account some of the background noise of what data can positively and
negatively achieve in the decisions being drafted on the basis of these.
The insights on a meta-level should not be forgotten when analysing the
data protection regime as a potential starting point for a wide data access
regime.
3.
4.
E.
Indra Spiecker genannt Döhmann
204 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748924999-175, am 29.10.2021, 10:20:10
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Proactive versus reactive regime
Data protection law as such and the GDPR in all its specificity are technol-
ogy laws,68 functioning according to the insights on how to regulate tech-
nologies whose development and effects are not yet fully known or indeed
predictable. This is very much true for digitalisation and information tech-
nology: The tremendous speed in which this technology evolves, the huge
investments by private and public actors, the new ubiquity of information
technology and data processing, the difficulty of assessing the results of da-
ta in decisions and the technology’s psychological, cognitive and educa-
tional effects are just a few very obvious examples of the unknowns in this
multi-actor, complex field.
Experiences from technology law and the understanding of state deci-
sion-making under conditions of uncertainty teach us in circumstances
such as these to use a proactive, preventive concept of regulation combined
with close monitoring and high flexibility and with clear models and
structures.69 Risk prevention, and not security management, has to be the
guiding principle.
Irreversible and uncontrollable consequences versus liability and damages
Data protection law pays close attention to the understanding that data
rights violations are not damages that can easily be controlled for and com-
pensated. As any loss of data means uncontrollable access to this data and
potential further use and distribution including recombination with other
data, the characteristic of information and privacy as common goods70
have to be reflected in any regulatory regime. Typical regulatory concepts
I.
II.
68 Cf. on the term ‘technology law’, Milos Vec, Kurze Geschichte des Technikrechts
(Springer 2011) 3–91, 4–8; in regard to computer law, Thomas Dreier and Oliver
Meyer-Brandt, ‘Computerrecht’ in Martin Schule and Rainer Schröder (eds),
Handbuch des Technikrechts (2nd edn, Springer 2003) 823; and data security,
Hannes Federrath and Andreas Pfitzmann, ‘Datensicherheit’ in Schule and
Schröder (ibid) 857; in regard to the relationship between technology and data
protection law, Hornung and Spiecker gen. Döhmann (n. 2) Einleitung paras
244–249; declaring the aspect of information law a technology law, Michael
Kloepfer, Informationsrecht (C.H. Beck 2002) § 1 para. 4.
69 See Indra Spiecker gen. Döhmann, Staatliche Entscheidungen unter Unsicherheit
(Mohr Siebeck 2021, forthcoming).
70 See at C. below.
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like absolute liability without culpability and easy compensation71 do not
function in conditions of such great uncertainty.
Understanding this already requires a careful defining of meaningful ac-
cess to data, as the price for any later corrections has to be paid by the data
subjects without being able to receive just compensation because data
breaches can hardly ever be fully retracted, certainly not under conditions
of professional information technology evaluation and exploitation. Data
protection rights violations cannot be cancelled, and they cannot be un-
done.
Specific, controlled, anti-discrimination interests versus overall transparency
and access
Transparency and free access to information for each and all sound intri-
guing. However, they leave out of consideration that information technol-
ogy is not available for all, and that the need for information depends on
the decision in which it is to be incorporated. Information can well be
used for purposes which violate common understandings in society, such
as anti-discrimination, equality before the law, or fair chances. The pur-
pose and the precise interest determine whether or not it is socially, eco-
nomically, legally, ethically, internationally and normatively desirable to
share data, and if so, under which conditions. Thus, unlimited access to
personal data and transparency without any requirement as to purpose do
not serve the common interest but the interest of a select few.
Conclusion and Outlook
We have lived in a knowledge society long enough to understand the im-
portance of data and also the difficulties in detecting data in decisions and
controlling the flow of data once it has been started. Surprisingly, our
regulatory impetus to prevent negative impact on society overall and to
create a fair division of data is not reacting strongly to this: We are gener-
ous in sharing data and making available the backbone of productivity –
III.
F.
71 See Spiecker gen. Döhmann (n. 69).
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for free. Numerous freedom of information regulatory impulses tell this
story forcefully.72
Uncontrollability of the input of data in the output of decisions requires
a three-step-test: Both the input of data, with its processing e.g. by recom-
bination, and the outcome of the decision have to be controlled.
Data protection law approaches all three steps from a particular, person-
ality and human rights perspective and thus offers answers to pressing
questions. It also gives important guidelines for the necessary weighing of
interests between the protection of data and access and distribution of data
beyond personal data.
The GDPR does not address the pressing issue of the gains and the
added value within the data lifecycle. It is not an instrument creating eco-
nomic or social distributive justice, nor does it attribute economic value. It
explicitly refrains from creating property rights, and it explicitly contra-
dicts the notion of data being foremost an economic asset. But it is an in-
strument to strengthen democratic values such as liberty, freedom of deci-
sion and autonomy.
Access to data is always a decision on third parties without their inclu-
sion, their participation or their knowledge. Modern information technol-
ogy often has little interest in the individual and its individuality, which
makes individual control and countermeasures even more difficult. A data-
protection-friendly regulatory regime to access of data will take these third-
party-effects into account and builds the limitations to data use into it.
In any decision of the legislature on whom to grant access to data the
decision on the use of this data is always incorporated. Data protection’s
interest in binding data processing to a cause and a purpose relies on basic
functionalities in situations of power. Insights into the foundations of state
control can assist in finding the proper legal standards. Among these stan-
dards is the core of all rationality: If there is a legitimate reason which can
be openly discussed, there is ground for data access, but data access with-
72 See, for example, Thomas Dreier and others (eds), Informationen der Öffentlichen
Hand – Zugang und Nutzung (Nomos 2016); Spiecker gen. Döhmann (n. 8);
Kloepfer (n. 68), especially § 4 paras 12–14; Jean Nicolas Druey, Information als
Gegenstand des Rechts – Entwurf einer Grundlegung (Schulthess 1995); Herbert
Burkert, ‘Public Sector Information: Towards a More Comprehensive Approach
in Information Law’ (1992) 3 (1) Journal of Law Information and Science 47;
Herbert Burkert, Informationszugang und Datenschutz: ein kanadisches Beispiel
(Nomos 1992). Cf. in regard to consistency of regulatory instruments like the
right to data portability, Graef, Husovec and Purtova (n. 37), proposing a compre-
hensive legal code concerning access to public information.
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out clear purpose cannot claim legitimacy. This, due to the special charac-
teristic of data, is a ground to start from.
In the end, all we know about data, about data processing and about de-
cision-making and its control calls for a data-protection-inspired regulatory
regime of data access, and that is in dubio pro data protection – including
trade and business secrets!
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